Abstract
Introduction
Researching the coincidences between the government-condoned Arab debate on the 'root causes' of Islamist terrorism and the EU's statements on that matter, we do not argue, or assume, that there would be a/one proper way of discussing or 'representing' terrorism and its causes. Indeed, we acknowledge that any kind of public and political attention to terrorism may function in favour of the terrorists' strategic calculus simply by emphasising the phenomenon. 2 Due to asymmetric power relations between terrorist groups and well-established governments (authoritarian and democratic alike), each kind of discussion benefits the aspirations of the asymmetrically weaker part (in this case the terrorist groups). This raises the paradoxical and serious question of how to appropriately approach a discussion of 'terrorism' -even under the condition that the participants agree on a definition. 3 When analysing debates, we intentionally avoid the term 'discourse' as it automatically resembles the Foucauldian concept of 'discourse analysis'. While we try to avoid the broad empirical focus of Foucault's concept, we do -though in a Foucauldian manner -recognize and use its achievement of directing academic analysis toward the distinct power aspirations which stand behind certain communicated world views and their terminologies as well as the power relations which might be their (un)intentional result. 4 This perspective enables us to enquire into the political consequences of representing and talking about terrorism and to relate the Arab and EU statements on Islamist terrorism to their affirmation of authoritarian governance in the cases of Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
Our analysis concentrates explicitly on the portrayal of perceived causes of Islamist terrorism.
We, therefore, evaluated general discussions on counter-terrorism only in so far as they allow conclusions on how causes of terrorism are construed. The selection of our examples was based 4 on the rationale that Egypt and Saudi Arabia enjoy considerable religious, cultural and political prominence in the Arab and broader Muslim world. In the context of the Egyptian and Saudi
Arabian debate we analysed the semi-official Egyptian Al-Ahram newspaper and the privately owned Saudi Ash-Sharq al-Awsat. While the latter has a broader regional outlook, the fact that its main revenue is generated within the Saudi market compels it to take 'Saudi sensitivities' into account. The inclusion of the English-language Al-Ahram Weekly (Egypt) and Arab News (Saudi Arabia) allowed us to assess the respective regimes' strategies of shaping international opinion.
With regard to the problem of how to talk about terrorism, the EU -i.e. not its single member states -appeared to be a particularly intriguing choice as a case study, because it is the international actor most concerned with a balanced political language, with impartial diplomatic efforts and with anti-bellicose policies. However, we will point out that these efforts of 'respectful objectivity' and a global multilateral socio-political agenda initiate the problem of 'talking about terrorism' in such a way as it conflicts with the EU's commitments to, and rhetoric of, democratic rule of law and human rights. Documents studied in the EU context are speeches by EU officials, primarily from and on behalf of the EU Commission as well as EU policy papers and declarations.
To limit the amount of the available Arabic material, while at the same time allowing for timeand space-related shifts in arguments, our research focused on specific time frames. These are the first two weeks after the attacks of 9/11, on a housing compound for foreign nationals in Ri- us to generate sufficient material to make general observations about the way those various incidents were being framed in influential Arab news outlets. 5 While emphasizing the anti-liberal tone of the dominant Arab arguments on Islamist terrorism, we do not offer an attempt to establish the latter's 'root causes'. Instead, we focus on the question of how the construction of and emphasis on possible 'root causes' reflects and serves particular political agendas. Our conclusion is that although the European Union and the authoritarian governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia are very different international actors with regard to their institutional set-up, foreign policies and self-perception they end up supporting comparable narratives on the causes of Islamist terrorism. By confronting the examples of the prevalent Arab arguments with marginalized liberal Arab interpretations of the analyzed events, we attempt to highlight the extent to which the EU's reluctance to more openly make the internal (political) predicaments of the Arab world a subject of discussion is helping to sideline alternative, antiauthoritarian Arab voices.
The Authoritarian Arab Interpretation of the Causes of Islamist Terrorism

Islamist Terrorism as a Result of Western Aggression
What is striking about the way the Egyptian newspapers The discussion of possible links between specific interpretations of Islam and terrorist violence was further discredited by commentators such as Salama Ahmad Salama, who in both his English and Arabic columns depicted a post-9/11 'war hysteria' that had supposedly generated the search for a 'scapegoat' and 'waves of racist hatred' against Arabs and Muslims living in the West. 19 The anti-Semitic overtones detectable in many commentaries that try to link Israel to Islamist terrorism became even more pronounced when prominent Lebanese commentator Samir Nafie's declaration that Egypt, a 'pivotal regional power', could provide the Arab world with a 'voice in channelling international anti-terrorist efforts' underscores the extent to which the official Egyptian terrorism debate is dominated by attempts to demonstrate this country's regional and global importance. 26 From a European perspective, Nafie's claim that Egypt, which has been subject to a special investigation of the United Nations committee set up under the authority of the global convention against torture, 27 possesses a 'storehouse of ideas concerning the legal and logistical requirements for organizing a global conference to formulate a comprehensive interna- Kuwaiti Ahmad ar-Ruba´i who criticized the 'gloating and lack of sympathy' and 'Schadenfreude' towards the victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 34 Interestingly, both felt compelled to link their morally-based critique with a utility-based argument about the possible negative effects such public celebrations might have for the PLO in particular and the Arabs in general. 35 In their critique, as-Sayyid Sa´id and ar-Ruba`i were joined by Egyptian commentator Mamoun
Fandy who used his column in Ash-Sharq al-Awsat to pounce on those who criticized the crimes of 9/11 while trying to rationalize them. For him the fact that U.S. politicians defended American
Muslims and Arabs in an hour of 'greatest rage and grief' symbolized the 'humanity' of U.S. so- 39 For him, the only crime that is worse than a terrorist attack is the kind of discourse that tries to involve Muslims and Arabs in a holy war. The EU Debate
Focus on International Conflicts and Cooperation
Given the authoritarian Arab governments' skilfulness in playing on the (increasing) European fear of being branded anti-Muslim, official EU statements tend to retreat to the safer rhetorical ground of stressing the link between the rise of Islamist terrorism and the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Throughout individual speeches and articles by EU politicians as well as papers from EU institutions, the unsolved nature and increasingly violent conduct of this conflict is presented as one of the main reasons for the emergence of Islamist terrorism. The conviction that both are directly intertwined, and that, consequently, the fight against terrorism has to go hand in hand with a successful settlement of the conflict is, for example, clearly expressed in the European Security Thus, by contextualizing Islamist terrorism as a phenomenon more or less directly linked to the international arena, the EU helps to turn 'regional stability' into a euphemism for the continued support of the authoritarian Arab status quo.
Framing Domestic Arab Issues in Terms of the EU's Trade Strategy
For a long time the so-called Barcelona process, launched in 1995, was treated as the central channel of EU engagement with its southern neighbourhood. 59 Its importance for our analysis In late 2002, it had already declared that 'the fight against terrorism can never be won unless combined with a broad alliance aimed at eradicating poverty and installing democracy, respect for the rule of law and human rights worldwide' since terrorism's root causes were 'poverty, human rights infringements, oppression and forcible relocation of persons, and lack of education'. 71 By connecting poverty with terrorism, even though this contradicts empirical evidence, pledged that the EU will be 'a loyal and sensitive partner, respectful of the sincerity of your commitment to the shared principles, supportive of your efforts to modernize and to reform.' 77 According to the independent European Policy Centre (EPC), the EU's reluctance to bring domestic sources of terrorism more forcefully into the discussion is directly linked to the concern that the application of the very principles which are sacredly upheld as EU governance such as democratization and the strengthening of civil society, can, at least momentarily, open avenues of political participation and increase the space for elements of radicalization, terrorism and instability. As Fraser Cameron puts it: '(The) dilemma for the EU -and for the US -is that accelerated promotion of democracy and human rights in the Arab world risks undermining existing regimes that are sometimes helpful in counter-terrorism, and could lead to Islamic fundamentalists taking power who will then disregard democracy and human rights.' 
